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LEGAL PUBLICATIONS BOARD OF
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STUART G. TIPTON,

HOMICIDE-MALICE AFORETHOUGHT.
-[Florida]
The deceased, one
Elbie Ellis, made a call upon the
defendant's daughter; the defendant ordered his daughter into the
house as Ellis came walking up,
and as she went in, the deceased
followed her, swearing as he went.
The evidence shows without contradiction that Ellis made an indecent proposal to the girl which
the father overheard, and he thereupon ordered the young man out
of the house. When Ellis retorted,
"I won't get out until I get ready,"
the father shot him with a shotgun,
which he testifies (without any
substantial contradiction other than
the fact that no weapon was afterward found on the body of the deceased) was used by him when he
noticed that the young man was
about to draw a pistol. The defendant was tried and convicted of
second degree murder. The following state statutory provisions were
considered as controlling: "The
unlawful killing of a human being,
when perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death of
the person killed . . . shall be murder in the first degree; . . . when

perpetrated by an act imminently
dangerous to another, and evincing
a depraved mind regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death
of any particular individual, it shall

Case Editor

be murder in the second degree."
Fla. Comp. Laws (1927) §7137.
"The offense of manslaughter embraces all killings which are neither
justifiable nor excusable homicide
nor murder."
Fla. Comp. Laws
(1927) §7141. Held: on appeal, reversed. "The evidence failed to
establish in the accused that depravity of mind essential to conviction of murder in the second degree; . . . in the most unfavorable
view of the evidence against the
accused, he was at most guilty of a
reasonably provoked but unnecessary killing which, as a matter of
law, is no greater crime than that
of manslaughter": Ramsey v. State
(Fla. 1934) 154 So. 855.
In the popular sense malice has
come to imply hatred, revenge, illwill, or evil intent. As applied in
the field of criminal law, however,
the layman's definition would either
be inadequate or entirely erroneous.
Malice may be found, for example,
where there is no hatred or personal ill-will, as in cases involving
suicide pacts: Turner v. State
(1907) 119 Tenn. 663, 108 S. W.
1139; People v. Roberts (1920) 211
Mich. 187, 178 N. W. 690; or where
a mother kills her illegitimate offspring: Jones v. State (1860) 29
Ga. 594; or in cases of felony murder, where the accused was an accomplice in the commission of a
felony, but took no part in the
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actual killing: People v. Peranio certain cases wherein there was no
(1923) 225 Mich. 125, 195 N. W. "malice aforethought" were par670; or was even unaware that a doned at that early date: 2 Pollock
killing had occurred: State v. Car- and Maitland, "History of English
lino (1922) 98 N. J. L. 48, 118 Atl. Law" (1895) 478; and the term
784; or in cases where third parties "malice prepensed" appears in the
are the innocent victims of the as- statutes, 4 Hen. VIII, c. 2 (1512).
sailant's attack: Carpis v. State The earliest constructions placed
(1921) 27 N. M. 265, 199 P. 1012; significance upon the time element,
Honeycutt v. State (1900) 42 Tex. i.e., the space for premeditation;
Cr. App. 129, 57 S. W. 806; People thus a case is reported wherein
v. Cohen (1922) 305 Ill. 506, 137 "malice aforethought" is contrasted
N. E. 511. In the Cohen case the with' "a sudden falling out :" 2 Poldefendant made an attack upon one lock and Maitland, op. cit. supra at
person, but unintentionally wounded p. 484, n. 2. It may readily be obanother instead. The indictment served that this association of
charged assault with intent to kill "aforethought" with "premeditaand murder the injured individual, tion" was but confusing the definiand the court gave an instruction tions of malice and intent, and this
authorizing a verdict of guilty if confusion has prevailed until modthe jury found from the evidence, ern times in some jurisdictions; e.g.,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the "Premeditation, or malice aforedefendant with malice aforethought, thought, is a necessary ingredient
either express or implied, made an to the crime of murder:" People v.
assault with a deadly weapon upon Erno (1925) 195 Cal. 272, 232 Pac.
the first individual with intent to 710. None will deny the kinship of
kill and murder, even though it malice and intent, but the growing
would appear that there was no in- tendency is away from the definitention to shoot the victim himself. tion of malice as an intent and
A conviction was affirmed. In cases toward the "state of mind" aspect
of felony murder, however, courts of malice: Perkins, "Malice Aforeexercise a discretion; the court said thought," 43 Yale L. Jour. 537
in the case of Powers v. Common- (1934). Professor Perkins, referwealth (1901) 110 Ky. 386, 61 S. ring to the legal aspects of negliW. 935, 63 S. W. 776: "Under our gence and the variation from civil
statute the removal of a corner- negligence through criminal neglistone is punishable by a short term gence to that "greater than criminal
in the penitentiary, and is therefore negligence," he says: "To express
a felony. If, in attempting this this notion the courts have resorted
offense, death were to result to one to such forms of expression as, 'an
conspirator by his fellow acciden- act dangerous to others-done so
tally dropping the stone upon him, recklessly or wantonly as to evince
no Christian court would hesitate to depravity of mind and a disregard
apply this limitation." The limita- of human life,' State v. Capps
tion referred to is the reduction of (1904) 134 N. C. 629, 46 S. E. 730;
the offense to manslaughter, al- 'such cruel acts and conduct as inthough the killing occurred in the dicate a reckless disregard of hucommission of a felony.
man life,' State v. Collins (Del.
The term "malice aforethought" 1903) 5 Penn. 263, 62 At. 224; 'an
was used as early as 1200 A. D., and intent to do any unlawful act which
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may probably result in depriving
the party of life,' Shorter v. State
(1922) 147 Tenn. 355, 247 S. W.
985; or 'an unlawful act, which in
its consequences naturally tends to
destroy the life .of a lhuman being,'
Ashford v. *State (1916) 144 Ga.
832, 88 S. E. 205."
It is well settled that malice
aforethought is not the produce of
premeditation; for example, a killing may be with malice aforethought although the design or intent to kill was formed "at the very
moment the fatal shot was fired":
State v. Hall (1932) 54 Nev. 213,
13 P (2d) 624; or "on the spur of
the moment": State v. Heidelberg
(1908) 102 La. 300, 45 So. 256; but
then, too, premeditation can transpire' as instantaneously as malice
aforethought, according to what
was said in Comnmonwealth v.
Dreher (1922) 274 Pa. 325, 118 Atl.
215: "An act is premeditated if
there was a previous deliberation
or a previous intent to kill, however
sudden and however quickly put
into execution; an instant of time
being sufficient." The decisions are
not unanimous, however, in distinguishing malice from intent. Professor Perkins shows in his article
"Malice Aforethought," supra, how
courts have determined malice on
the existence or non-existence of
intent; quoting: "Express malice
aforethought has been said to mean
(assuming the absence of justification or excuse or any mitigating
circumstances sufficient to reduce
the homicide to manslaughter) : (1)
an intent to kill the very person
killed, Ferell v. State (1875) 43
Tex. 503; (2) an intent to kill the
very person killed or to inflict great
bodily injury upon him, State v.
tFaino (Del. 1894) 1 Mary. 492, 41
AtI. 134; (3) an intent to kill some
person, People v. Cochran (1924)
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313 Ill. 508, 145 N. E. 207; and (4)
an intent to cause the death or great
bodily injury to some person, Rex
v. Oneby (1727) 2 Ld. Raym. 1485,

1489, 92 Eng. Rep. R. 465; State v.
Brown (Del. 1902) 4 Penn. 120,
124, 53 At. 354, 355." Decisions
such as these incorporate intent in
the term malice; often statutes do
too. The Illinois statute, for example, provides: "Express malice
is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a
fellow creature, which is manifested by external circumstances
capable of proof." Ill. Rev. Stat.
(Smith-Hurd, 1933) C. 38, §358.
But in the light of modern aspects
of malice, it seems a more accurate
wording would be: "Express malice
accompanies . . ." or "is denoted

by that deliberate intention . . ."
The section relating to implied malice would not be open to this correction ("malice shall be implied
when no considerable provocation
appears, or when all the circumstances of the killing show an
abandoned and malignant heart").
Professor Perkins' concluding definition of malice aforethought is "an
unjustifiable, inexcusable and unmitigated
man-endangering-state-ofmind," which includes, he po 'ts

out: (1) intent to kill; (2) intent
to inflict great bodily injury, (3)
wanton and wilful disregard; (4)
perpetration of felony, and resisting lawful arrest; that is, the wilful
doing of any act which involves a
subsequent element of human risk.
Significance has long attached to
this "man-endangering" or human
risk element as evidenced by statutes which constitute murder of
those homicides occurring in the
perpetration of the commonly enumerated felonies of rape, robbery,
arson, and burglary.
Florida decisions have held that
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the statutory definitions of murder
do not make malice an element of
the offense, Riggins-v. State (1919)
78 Fla. 459, 83 So. 267; but that
premeditation is anq essential element of that crime, Miller v. State
(1918) 75 Fla. 136, 77 So. 669. The
principal case holds that "malice in
law refers to that state of mind
which is reckless of law and of the
legal rights of the citizen in a person's conduct toward that citizen,"
citing Colwel v. Tinker (1902) 169

N. Y. 531, 62 N. E. 668, 58 L. R. A.
765, 98 Am. St. Rep. 587; and later
Davis v. Hearst (1911)1 160 Cal.
143, 116 Pac. 530; but it is important to note that these last two memtioned cases are both civil suits,
the one an action for criminal conversion, the other an action for
libel. Definitions of malice as they
occur in decisions handed down in
civil actions have little bearing on
the malice aforethought of the
criminal law, and reference to such
decisions by the courtsi sitting in
criminal cases should be made cautiously. A holding in the case of
State v. Moynihan (1919) 93 N. J.
L. 253, 106 AtI. 817 is that "malice,
ir its legal sense, means nothing
more than an evil state of mind.
The premeditated and deliberate
design of a sane man to kill a human being, purposely executed without adequate legal justification,
stamps the act as the result of an
*evil state of mind; hence, an act
conceived in malice. The law implies malice from the commission
of the wrongful act."
Professor Perkins' "man-endangering-state-of-mind" definition appears remarkably adequate, on a
study of the decisions; the state of
mind aspect seems indeed a more
accurate approach to the problem.
LAWRENCE B. MuRDocx.

ASSAULT wiTH INTENT TO KILL-

INTOXICATION

AS

A

DMrENSF.-

[Oklahoma] The defendant while
in a state of partial intoxication
went to the residence of his tenant,
one Wilson, with whom he had had
some prior difficulty, and engaged
in a quarrel, which resulted in'
Wilson's being ordered to vacate the
premises within thirty days. As
Wilson started to leave, the defendant shot at him three times, barely
missing him. The defendant was
prosecuted for assault with intent
to kill, and as a defense he claimed
to have been intoxicated to such
an extent that he was incapable of'
forming a specific intent. He was
convicted and sentenced to one year
in the penitentiary. Held: on appeal, affirmed. The question of intoxication is one of fact to be decided by the tri4 court (a jury
having been waived) and that court
had sufficient evidence before it to
find that the defendant was not intoxicated to a degree that would
render him incapable of forming an
intent. Weber v. State (Okla.
1934) 33 Pac. (2d) 232.
The state has the burden of proving every accusation made in the
all
Consequently,
indictment.
charges which include an "intent,"
such as assault with intent to kill,
assault with intent to rob, or assault with intent to rape, etc., reqtdre thd prosecuting attorney to
prove an intent to commit the particular crime. In order to disprove
the presence of such a condition of
mind, an accused frequently defends upon the ground of having
been in a mental lapse due to intoxication, drugs, or various mental
diseases. The degree to which a
defendant has become intoxicated,
is a matter to be decided by the
jury, as is the question of whether
the intoxication is so complete as
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to render him incapable of forming despite any specific intention to ina specific intent. State v. Massey jure, is responsible for the conse(1924) 20 Ala. App. 56, 100 So. quences of his act." (2 Coke, Litt.
625. Intoxication as a defense may sec. 247a).
be used when the charge is of any
The Illinois Supreme Court corcrime in which the state bas the rectly states the general view in
burden of proving an intent. State People v. Brislane (1920) 295 111.
v. Johnson (Iowa, 1934) 245 N. W. 241, 129 N. E. 185, that if the de728. If the essential element is fendant at the time of the commislacking, namely intent, by reason sion of the crime charged, was
that the intoxication rendered the wholly incapable of forming an inassailant incapable of having an in- tent, whether from intoxication or
tent, the criminal prosecution is any other causes, he is guilty of no
thereby defeated. This appears to crime. This rule was supported by
be the general rule, as it is well
Crosby v. People (1891) 137 Ill.
substantiated in Weick v. Common- 325, 27 N. E. 49; Schwabacker v.
wealth (1924) 201 Ky. 632, 258 S. People (1897) 165 111. 618, 46 N. E.
W. 90; People v. Neetens (1919)
809; Bruen v. People (1903) 206
42 Cal. App. 596, 184 Pac. 27; Peo- Ill. 417, 69 N. E. 24; People v.
ple v. Cochran (1924) 313 Ill. 508, Jones (1914) 263 Ill. 564, 105 N.
142 N. E. 207; Graham v. Common- E. 744.
wealth (1923) 200 Ky. 161, 252 S.
FRANKLIN B. WITTER.
W. 1012.
However, drunkenness
cannot be a successful defense in
a case of assault with intent to rape.
PRESENCE OF AccuSED DURING
State v. Comer (1922) 296 Mo. 1, PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS. - [Mis247 S. W. 179. The crime of as- sissippi]
The defendant was insault with intent to commit rape dicted for murder.
His attorney,
appears to be an exception to the before the setting of trial date,
rule because of its nature being moved for a special venire and the
such that a man could not attempt order was entered. When the case
to commit the act without having came to trial, the attorney made a
a desire to do so; the matter of in- motion to quash the special venire
tent being liberally construed by the on the ground that the defendant
court.
was not present when the order was
Although intoxication may be entered. There was a conflict of
such as to preclude the possibility evidence as to whether the defendof there being a specific intent, the ant was present, but the motion was
defense in certain cases may be denied and an exception was taken.
held unavailable on the ground that Held: on appeal, affirmed. Even if
the defendant has voluntarily put the defendant were absent it was
himself in that condition. In State not a denial of his constitutional
v. Jordon (1920) 285 Mo. 62, 225 right to be present during his trial
S. W. 905, involving the crime of since the absence occurred at a preassault with intent to kill, the court liminary proceeding: Ford v. State
(Miss. 1934) 155 So. 220.
was willing to supply intent by construction, giving as a reason the
This case is the latest in a line
well recognized principle that "one of decisions that are apparently
who voluntarily assumes an attitude unanimous in holding that absence
likely to produce harm to others, from a preliminary proceeding is
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not prejudicial to a defendant:
Mabry v. State (1888) 50 Ark. 492,
8 S. W. 823; Milton v. State (1902)
134 Ala. 42, 32 So. 653; Vogel v.
State (1908) 138 Wis. 315, 119 N.
W. 180; Oliver v. State (1913) 70
Tex. Crim. App. 140, 159 S. W.
235; Ammons v. State (1913) 65
Fla. 166, 61 So. 496; Logan v.
Stale (1915) 131 Tenn. 75, 173 S.
Wj 443; Benton v. State (1928)
108 Tex. Crim. App. 285, 300 S.
W. 75. The reasons assigned for
the immateriality are similar in the
various jurisdictions. In Logan v.
State, supra, it was said that such
an order constituted an administrative duty with which the defendant
had no concern. In Milton v. State,
supra, it was called "ministerial,"
while in Mabry v. State, supra, the
court said it formed no part of the
trial.
The rule enunciated in the instant case seems to be the only
sensible one to apply. There is a
growing tendency throughout the
country not to disturb jury verdicts
in criminal cases on technicalities
which occasion no substantial harm
to the defendant. The error complained of in the principal case is
harmless and certainly should not
be made the basis of a reversal and
a new trial which would cost the
state money and at the same time
serve no useful purpose.
GERALD F. WHITE.

TESTITMONY

OF

ACCOMPLICES

-

DISQUALIFIC.ATION
BY
APPROVEMEXT.-[Florida]
The defendant
and four other persons were jointly
indicted for murder and found
guilty. The defendant appealed,
one assignment of error being that
two of his co-defendants who appeared as the state's witnesses
were "approvers" and therefore dis-

qualified to testify, since a Florida
statute provided that "approvers
shall not be admitted in any case
whatever."
(Fla. Comp. Laws,
1927, §8381.)
Although the trial
court's verdict was reversed on
other grounds, the appellate court
decided, upon this issue, that the
abolition of this ancient practice of
approvement did not disqualify the
co-defendants as witnesses since
they are not considered "approvers"
within the common law meaning of
that term. Lee v. State (Fla. 1934)
155 So. 123.
Blackstone states that approvement occurs "when a person indicted of treason or felony, and arraigned for the same, doth confess
the fact before plea pleaded: and
appeals or accuses others, his accomplicesA in order to obtain his
pardon."
The party appealed or
accused is called the appellee, and
the party accusing the approver.
4 BI. Com. (15th Ed., 1809) 330.
A successful approver was entitled
to his pardon as of right.
A prisoner could be allowed by
the court to be an approver only
when he had in fact committed a
capital offense, either treason Gr
felony, and had pleaded guilty. If
so allowed the prisoner took an oath
in court to discover all crimes of
felony or treason that were committed by the .approver in company
with the appellee. A coroner was
appointed by the court to take the
approver's appeal which was equivalent to an indictment. 2 Hawki:s,
Pleas of the Crown" (1788) 296.
The 'law held approvers up to a
high standard of honesty. and integrity, and the penalty for any misstatement in the appeal or act showing a lack of good faith was hanging. If the approver claimed -that
the appeal was made by duress, the
coroner was examined under oath
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concerning the claim, and if the
coroner affirmed that it was made
of the approver's own free will, the
approver was executed. The coroner put the appeal in writing when
the approver first recited it, and
some days later the approver was
made to repeat it word for word
in court. If a mistake was made in
a single detail the court considered
that the appeal was falsified, and
hanged the approver forthwith. A
like penalty was inflicted if the approver appealed against someone
not found in the kingdom, but process of outlawry issued against the
appellee regardless of the execution
of the approver. 2 Hale, "Pleas of
the Crown" (1778) 234. If the
accused once plead not guilty he
could not be an approver, for if he
changed his plea to guilty and asked
to be sworn as an approver it was
obvious to the court that he had,
told a falsehood as his confession
contradicted his former plea."
Hawkins, op. cit. supra at p. 295.
It was entirely discretionary with
the court whether a prisoner should
be allowed to be sworn as an approver and if it appeared that he
was a principal and tempted the
others the court would reject him
as an approver. Rex v. Rudd (1775)
1 Cowp. 331, 98 Eng. Rep. R. 1114.
The appellee was allowed to take
his exceptions to the sufficiency of
the appeal. Grounds for such exceptions were: that the approver
was not in prison but at large; that
the approver was over seventy years
of age, or a woman, or maimed,
whereby appellee would be deprived
of his right to trial by battle; or
that the approver was already outlawed because of another felony. 2
Hale, op. cit. supra at p. 233. An
appellee could not, however, himself
become an approver "not only because it would falsify the appeal of
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the first approver in supposing that
he had omitted some of his partners,
but also because it would cause him
an indefinite delay: -for the appellee
of such an approver might as well
become an approver of others, and
so on." 2 Hawkins, op. cit. supra
at p. 295.
If the appellee did not take exception to the appeal, but pleaded
to the felony, he could put himself
on trial either by battle or by the
country. If trial by battle were
chosen and the appellee vanquished
the approver, the appellee was set
free and the approver hanged, but
if the approver prevailed, the appellee was held for the crime and
the approver was entitled to a pardon as of right. If an approver
should appeal several persons it
was necessary for him to vanquish
them all before he could demand
his pardon. 2 Hale, op. cit. supra
at p. 233.
If the appellee elected to stand
trial, the approver was sworn as a
witness, and Lord Hale points out
that although he is a confessed
felon, yet his testimony against the
appellee gains a "probable credibility" because "he accuseth himself by his confession." Ibid. The
approver's testimony or evidence is
not conclusive, as the credibility of
the witness was, then as now, a
matter for the determination of the

jury.
By the beginning of the 16th century the practice of approvement
had fallen into disuse because it was
found that more harm came to innocent men as a result of false accusations of villains than benefit to
the public by discovery and conviction of real criminals. 2 Hate, op.
cit. supra at p. 226. In the leading
case of Rex v. Rudd, supra, Lord
Mansfield said that approvement
was one method by which an accom-
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plice could acquire a right to a pardon, but that, while approvement
was still a part of the common law,
the practice by long discontinuance
had grown into disuse. He distinguished this old practice of approvement under which the approver had
a legal right to a pardon from the
practice of turning evidence for the
Crown. In the latter case, he points
out, if the accused acts fairly and
openly, and discovers the whole
truth, though he is not entitled of
right to a pardon, yet the usage of
the courts is to suspend prosecution against him, and he has an
equitable title to a recommendation
for the King's mercy. But he is
not entitled to this exemption from
prosecution as a matter of right:
Rex v. Brunton (1821) Russ. & Ry.
454, 168 Eng. Rep. R. 894; Ex
Parte Wells (1855) 18 How. 307.
This rule has always been followed
in the United States: United States
v. Ford (1878) 99 U. S. 594. In
the Ford case the court, in holding
that a district attorney has no authority to contract that a person accused of an offense against the
United States shall not be prosecuted if, when examined as a witness against his accomplices, he
fully discloses his and their guilt,
said that the usage of not prosecut•ing an accomplice who has fully
testified against his associates in
guilt had its origin in the ancient
practice of approvement.
The old Illinois Code, like the
present Florida Code, declares that
approvers shall not be allowed to
give testimony: §17, Scates' Comp.
337 (1858).
The courts at first
made no distinction between an accomplice and an approver, but the
Supreme court in Stevens v. People
(1905) 215 Ill. 593, 74 N. E. 786,
said: "More recently the courts
have come to recognize the public

necessity of admitting such evidence in order that criminals may
be brought to justice." .In the instant case the Florida court made
a sharp distinction between accomplices and approvers on the ground
that the alleged approvers had fulfilled relatively few of the old common law requirements of an
approver.
DAvD B. RicHARnsox.

DOUBLE

JEOPARDy -

ADULTERY -

LEWDNESS.-[Wisconsin]
The defendant, having lived with a woman
not his wife for a period of about
one Year, was convicted on a
charge of lewd and lascivious conduct under a Wisconsin statute (St.
1933, No. 351.04). When, following service of sentence, it was
learned that the defendant was a
married man, a warrant issued
charging him with having committed the crime of adultery in violation of statute (Wis. St. 1933,
No. 351.01).
The defendant contended that the act with which he
was originally charged was a continuous offense made so by a series
of acts creating but one offense
within the meaning of the stat.itc
under which he had already been
convicted and punished. The defendant therefore claimed that his
prior conviction precluded a prosecution for adultery on the grounds
of a former jeopardy for the offense committed. On the trial for
adultery, the following question was
certified to the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin for settlement: did the
conviction of the defendant in the
district court for lewd and lascivious conduct constitute a bar to the
prosecution for adultery in the
municipal court, where the evidence
produced in the secondb trial was
the same as that brought forward
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in first except for additional proof
of the defendant being a married
man. The court held -that prior
conviction was nQt a bar and that
no double jeopardy right would be
violated, for offenses are not the
same when there are distinct elements in one which are not included
in the other, even though both relate to one transaction: State, v.
Brooks (Wis. 1934) 254 N. W. 374.
Cases are not infrequent where
different offenses are committed in
the same transaction or transactions and it is generally held
that the rule that a person
cannot twice be tried or put in
jeopardy for the same offense has
no application where two separate
and distinct crimes are committed
by one and the same act. Thus an
acquittal on a charge of arson does
not bar a prosecution for burning
goods to injure an insurance company, People v. Fox (1915) 269 Ill.
300, 110 N. E. 29; a conviction for
an assault with a deadly weapon,
with intent to commit murder, is
not a bar to a subsequent prosecution for an attempt to commit robbery, People v. Bentley (1888) 77
Cal. 7, 18 Pac. 799; a conviction for
assault and battery will be no bar
to a trial for manslaughter, where
the injuries result in death after the
former conviction, State v. Littlefield (1880) 70 Me. 452; conviction
for disturbing the peace by loud and
vociferous language does not bar a
conviction for assault by use of a
gun in an angry, threatening manner, Clayton v. State (1917) 81
Tex. Cr. 385, 197 S. W. 591; conviction for an assault with intent
to rape forms no bar to a prosecution for lewd, immoral, and lascivious acts with a child, State v.
Jacobson (1924) 197 Iowa 547, 197
N. W. 638; also in England, a conviction for sodomy was held not to
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prevent a prosecution on a charge
of gross indecency, The King v.
Barron (1914) 2 K. B. 570.
It
may therefore be stated that as a
general rule, where two offenses
grow out of the same transaction
and are severable and distinct,
prosecution for one offense resulting in either a conviction or an acquittal will not bar prosecution for
the other offense.
In the instant case therefore the
problem becomes one of differentiating between the statutory crimes
of adultery and lewdness, the lewdness in question being that lewd
and lascivious conduct involved in
illicit cohabitation. The question is
whether or not the crimes coincide,
or not doing so, what additional
evidence is necessary for proof of
the one crime after a trial has been
had for the other. There are four
elements in which the two crimes
are totally different and easily distinguishable. In the first element,
that of public policy, the two
crimes are not the same. Lewd and
lascivious behavior is a defiance of
the usual conventions recognized in
our laws as standards of decency.
It is sought by law to prevent acts
detrimental to the morals of the
community. However in the matter of adultery, the offense is a
transgression against the marriage
relation, which relation the law
seeks to protect.
Although both
mightg be classed as questions of
public policy, they are different,
lewd and lascivious conduct being
a violation to the entire field of
public morals whereas a single act
of adultery is damaging in the main
only to the offender's marital relationship.
Ini the second element, that of
continuity of offense, the two
crimes differ materially. Lewdness
constitutes a continuing offense,
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coupled with the willful creation of
a bad reputation for the parties involved. Where lewd and lascivious

hand no notoriety is attached to
adultery, only proof of marriage
and the act or acts of intercourse
conduct is charged, the evidence need be given. 2 Wharton, "Crimnecessary to support a prosecution inal Law" (12th ed. 1932) sec. 2095,
must be something more than that 2096. A fourth element is that of
of a single act of fornication or marriage. To the charge of aduladultery, or even of several such tery, a claim of non-marriage would
acts where disconnected and secret. be a defense while in a prosecution
2 Wharton, "Criminal Law" (12th for lewdness, the problem of mared. 1932) sec. 2109. However, riage is immaterial and of no conwhere the crime of adultery has sequence except as bearing on
been charged against the offender, subsequent charges.
it is generally held that a single act
Even though these several maof intercourse between one married terial differences exist, proof of unperson and another, makes that lawful intercourse is necessary for
married person liable to prosecu- conviction in each criminal charge.
tion. In' a majority of states, However complete proof might be
adultery is held not to be a con- of a charge of lewdness, it would
tinuing offense, but each act of not be sufficient to warrant a conadultery constitutes a separate of- viction for a subsequent charge of
fense. 2 C. J. 13.
adultery without the additional
In two other elements also, tne proof, of the defendant's marriage.
crimes may be noted to possess sub- The problem of justice in so punstantial differences. Under most ishing an offender for two distinct
statutes, it is an essential element offenses growing out of the same
of the offense of lewdness that the act is a perplexing one and should
cohabitation involved be open and be left to the discretion of the trial
notorious, People v. Stern (1918)
judge. The defendant, having com207 Ill. App. 154; Commonwealth mitted two crimes by a single act,
v. Munson (1879) 127 Mass. 459; must stand or fall by his separate
Jamison v. State (1906) 117 Tenn. defenses.
58, 94 S. W. 675. On the other
CLYDE THEODORE NISSEN.

